Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian by Harcourt, Bernard E.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2007 
Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic Authoritarian 
Libertarian 
Bernard E. Harcourt 
Columbia Law School, bharcourt@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian, 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW, VOL. 74, P. 1723, 2007; UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW & ECONOMICS OLIN 
WORKING PAPER NO. 331; UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PUBLIC LAW WORKING PAPER NO. 152 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1460 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
CHICAGO  
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 331 
(2D SERIES) 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 152 
 
 
JUDGE RICHARD POSNER ON CIVIL LIBERTIES: 
PRAGMATIC AUTHORITARIAN LIBERTARIAN 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt 
 
 
 
THE  LAW  SCHOOL  
THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  
 
February 2007, revised March 2007 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and 
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the 
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html 
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=965578  
  
Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: 
Pragmatic Authoritarian Libertarian 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 How do you reconcile an opinion like Edmond v Goldsmith1—or any of those 
other streaks of libertarianism in areas ranging from drug control to human sexuality—
with the anti-civil libertarian positions that Richard Posner advocates in his book Not a 
Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency?2 The book itself is self-
consciously directed against a civil libertarian framework. “The sharpest challenge to the 
approach that I am sketching,” Richard Posner knowingly anticipates, “will come from 
civil libertarians,” by which he means those “adherents to the especially capacious view 
of civil liberties that is often advanced in litigation and lobbying by the American Civil 
Liberties Union.”3 In his book, Richard Posner argues in defense of the use of coercive 
interrogation techniques “up to and including torture”4; in support of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) program of warrantless electronic surveillance of American 
citizens5; in favor of criminally punishing the dissemination (including by the media) of 
classified material concerning national security6; and in defense of the constitutionality 
(though not yet the necessity) of prohibiting extremist speech.7 By the end of the book, 
Richard Posner advances a novel judicial doctrine of “national security necessity” which 
would essentially extend a form of qualified immunity “to national security officials who 
violate a constitutional right in good faith in compelling situations of necessity,” as a 
better and simpler alternative to presidential pardons.8 
                                                 
1 183 F3d 659 (7th Cir 1999), affd, City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
2 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (Oxford 2006). 
3  Id at 41. 
4  Id at 152. 
5 Id at 99–100. 
6  Id at 105–11. 
7  Id at 152. 
8  Id at 155. 
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 In the Edmond case, in contrast, Judge Posner enjoins the Indianapolis police 
department from setting up effective roadblocks to catch drug offenders.9 The 
roadblocks, it seemed, had everything going for them: they distributed the costs of 
enforcement evenly across motorists, interfered as minimally as possible with their 
movement, invaded only slightly their privacy interests, and, according to everyone on 
the Seventh Circuit panel, produced very “high” rates of successful searches.10 They were 
also randomly administered, which means that police officers could not individually 
discriminate against African-American drivers—or at least, less easily.11 Despite this, 
Judge Posner reverses the lower federal court—which had not enjoined the police 
practice—and puts a stop to the roadblocks, resting the decision on the arguable notion 
that the police did not have any “individualized suspicion” to stop and question any 
motorist12—a legal fiction that really makes little sense to anyone, especially to an 
economist or a law-and-economics trained lawyer, who conceives of reasonable 
suspicion in probabilistic terms. As Judge Frank Easterbrook makes plain in his 
dissenting opinion, it is extremely easy to write the decision the other way;13 in fact, the 
guiding federal precedent in roadblock cases seems to be that the government wins and 
the civil libertarians lose. Judge Posner nevertheless sides with the civil libertarians in a 
decision that is affirmed by the liberal wing of the Supreme Court. 
 How then do we reconcile Judge Posner the author of the Edmond opinion and 
other libertarian positions ranging from drug enforcement14 to anti-sodomy statutes15 with 
Richard Posner the author of Not a Suicide Pact? 
                                                 
9 Edmond, 183 F3d at 666. 
10 Id at 662. 
11 Id at 663. 
12 Id. 
13 See id at 666–71 (Easterbrook dissenting). 
14 Richard Posner, in his personal capacity, is substantially opposed to the war on drugs. Posner writes that, 
“If the resources used to wage the war were reallocated to other social projects, such as reducing violent 
crime, there would probably be a net social gain.” He adds that “we normally allow people to engage in 
such [self-destructive] behavior if they want; it is an aspect of liberty.”  See, Richard Posner, The War on 
Drugs, The Becker-Posner Blog (Mar 20, 2005), online at http://www.becker-posner-
blog.com/archives/2005/03/the_war_on_drug.html (visited Feb 23, 2007). 
15 Richard Posner favored decriminalization of homosexual sodomy before the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), striking down Texas’ homosexual sodomy statute. See Richard 
A. Posner, Sex and Reason 294–299 (Harvard 1992). Posner develops in his work, Sex and Reason, an 
economic theory of sexuality that, as a descriptive matter, embraces a rational choice perspective on sexual 
behavior and, from a normative perspective, adopts a libertarian position on sexual regulation—“not to be 
confused,” Posner emphasizes, “with either libertine or modern liberal.” Id at 3.  See generally Bernard E. 
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 In his book, Richard Posner offers a simple answer: the discontinuity merely 
reflects the need to recalibrate the weights associated with the conventional balance 
between personal liberty and public security in the case of national emergencies. All 
constitutional analyses of law enforcement programs, Posner explains, rest on a balancing 
between the competing constitutional values of liberty and security. In times of 
emergency, those values need to be recalibrated so that public safety is afforded slightly 
greater weight. Richard Posner writes: 
 
I have argued that the proper way to think about constitutional rights in a 
time such as this is in terms of the metaphor of a balance. One pan 
contains individual rights, the other community safety, with the balance 
needing and receiving readjustment from time to time as the weights of the 
respective interests change. The safer we feel, the more weight we place 
on the interest in personal liberty; the more endangered we feel, the more 
weight we place on the interest in safety, while recognizing the 
interdependence of the two interests.16 
 
A national emergency, such as a war, creates a disequilibrium in the 
existing system of constitutional rights. Concerns for public safety now 
weigh more heavily than before. The courts respond by altering the 
balance, curtailing civil liberties in recognition that the relative weights of 
the competing interests have changed in favor of safety. This is the 
pragmatic response, and pragmatism is a dominant feature not only of 
American culture at large but also of the American judicial culture.17 
 
 This explanation has the virtue of simplicity. What I would like to suggest, 
though, is that a close reading of the Edmond opinion reflects a slightly more 
complicated and technical framework than mere balancing—one that ultimately revolves 
around a choice concerning the proper level of analysis to review law enforcement 
programs. The framework derives from a libertarian origin and, under normal conditions, 
tilts ever so slightly in favor of civil liberties. At the same time, though, it is deeply 
pragmatic—it ensures, for ordinary criminal cases, the regular structure of constitutional 
analysis, including, for instance, the need for “individualized suspicion” to meet the 
standard of reasonable suspicion, but it carves out a massive exception for national 
                                                                                                                                                 
Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay- and Lesbian-Free Zone”: On the Radical Dissents of 
Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers. [Raising Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal 
Law], 94 J Crim L & Criminol 503, 513–515 (2004). 
16  Posner, Not a Suicide Pact at 148 (cited in note 2). 
17  Id at 147. 
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security emergencies that operates predominantly by means of a procedural device that 
triggers a program-level cost-benefit analysis.  
 The complete framework operates as follows. In ordinary criminal cases 
involving traditional police functions, the reasonableness of a search is determined by the 
existence or non-existence of “individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.” The default 
position protects individual liberty, and this can only be overcome by the presence of 
individualized suspicion. This represents a libertarian framework insofar as it does not 
allow cost-benefit analysis or pragmatic considerations. In contrast, in the case of a 
national emergency, the reasonableness of a search turns on an evaluation—at the 
program level—of the costs and benefits of the program. This represents a social welfare 
calculus and it tends to favor the government. 
 I interpret this framework, ultimately, as pragmatic libertarianism 
authoritarianism because it reveals a personal taste and inclination on Richard Posner’s 
part that favors law enforcement authority over civil liberties whenever the stakes are 
high. These terms—libertarian, pragmatic, and authoritarian—may seem hard to 
reconcile at first blush, but I hope to make their relation, or interdependence, more 
coherent over the course of this Essay. 
 Posner is brutally honest in his book and concedes that the weighing of liberty and 
security is a metaphorical process that is entirely subjective. “[T]he ‘weighing,’” Posner 
writes, “is usually metaphorical. The consequences judges consider are imponderables, 
and the weights assigned to them are therefore inescapably subjective.”18 How and when 
to add weights in the case of a national emergency, it turns out, reveals more about the 
judge and his or her personality, than it does about national security needs. “Each judge 
brings to the balancing process preconceptions that may incline him to give more weight 
to inroads on personal liberty than to threat to public safety, while another judge, bringing 
different preconceptions to the case, would reverse the weights,” Posner concedes. “The 
weights are influenced by personal factors, such as temperament (whether authoritarian 
or permissive), moral and religious values, life experiences that may have shaped those 
                                                 
18  Id at 24–25. 
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values and been shaped by temperament, and sensitivities and revulsions of which the 
judge may be quite unaware.”19 
 What I would like to propose in this Essay, then, is to read closely Judge Posner’s 
opinion in Edmond against the backdrop of his book Not a Suicide Pact, in order to 
interpret—a bit as one would a Rorschach inkblot—the temperament, values, and 
sensitivities of a remarkable jurist and wonderful colleague, Judge Richard Posner, on the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession to the federal bench. 
 
I. INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION VERSUS PROGRAM-LEVEL REVIEW 
 
 In Edmond, Judge Posner, sitting as chief judge, was called upon to decide the 
constitutionality of police roadblocks intended to detect drug contraband.20 On six 
occasions between August and November 1998, the Indianapolis police department had 
set up roadblocks on the city streets to catch drug offenders. The location of these 
roadblocks were determined weeks in advanced based on information regarding area 
crime statistics and traffic flow. The roadblocks were conducted during the daytime and 
were identified with signs that read: “NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT __ MILE AHEAD, 
NARCOTICS K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP.”21 At each site, approximately 
thirty police officers were present, and they would stop in total a predetermined number 
of vehicles. A group of vehicles would be diverted to the search area, and the other traffic 
would then be allowed to go through until the police had finished processing the group of 
stopped vehicles.22 With regard to each stop, a police officer would approach the driver 
and request his or her driver’s license and car registration. The stopped cars and their 
passengers would then be subject to a plain view search of the interior through the car 
windows, and a dog-sniffing search of the exterior of the automobiles. According to the 
police, the entire process was designed not to exceed five minutes.23 
 Over the course of the six roadblocks, 1,161 vehicles were stopped. The stops 
produced 55 drug-related arrests and 49 non-drug related arrests (for offenses such as 
                                                 
19  Id. 
20 Judge Posner’s opinion was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court. See City of Indianapolis v 
Edmond, 531 US 32 (2000). 
21 Edmond, 531 US at 35–36. 
22  Id at 35. 
23  Id. 
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driving with an expired driver’s license), resulting in a 4.74 percent drug-arrest hit rate 
and an overall hit rate of 8.96 percent.24 
 The roadblocks were perceived as successful in detecting illicit drug and other 
criminal violations. Judge Posner repeatedly refers to the resulting hit rate as “high” and 
adds that it is “vastly higher than, for example, the probability of a hit as a result of the 
screening of embarking passengers and their luggage at airports.”25 Judge Posner 
writes—though there is no factual basis in the record for this—that “the deterrence of 
drug offenses produced by these hits advances the strong national, state, and local policy 
of discouraging the illegal use of controlled substances.”26 Judge Easterbrook similarly 
refers to the program in glowing terms: “The program is spectacularly successful as 
roadblocks go; 9.4% of those stopped are arrested, with the reason equally divided 
between driving and drug crimes.”27 Citing the Martinez-Fuerte Border Patrol case and 
the Sitz sobriety checkpoint case—cases which involved hit rates of 0.12 and 1.6 percent 
respectively—Easterbrook notes that “[r]oadblocks with much lower rates of success 
have been held consistent with the fourth amendment.”28 
Though admittedly important to a cost-benefit analysis, Judge Posner’s opinion 
does not turn on the rate of successful searches, but rather on the level of the 
reasonableness assessment—on whether the reasonableness of any search is to be decided 
at the level of the entire roadblock program or at the level of an individual motorist stop. 
Judge Posner makes this clear in the very first paragraphs of the opinion: if the court were 
to adopt a program-level analysis, Posner suggests, then the court would perform a cost-
benefit analysis and the outcome would most certainly favor law enforcement. Most 
program-level evaluations of costs and benefits do. But if the court were to adopt an 
individual-level assessment focused on the individual stop, the outcome would likely 
differ. Posner writes: 
 
                                                 
24  Edmond, 183 F3d at 661. 
25 Id at 662.  
26 Id (emphasis added). 
27 Id at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting). I’m not sure how Judge Easterbrook got to the 9.4 percent figure. 
Both Judge Posner and Justice O’Connor report similar search success rates of 104 motorists of a total pool 
of 1,161, or 8.96 percent. See Edmond, 531 US at 35; Edmond, 183 F3d at 661 (majority). 
28  Edmond, 183 F3d at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting), citing United States v Martinez-Fuerte, 428 US 543 
(1976) and Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990). 
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Whether the seizures effected by Indianapolis’s drug roadblocks are 
reasonable may depend on whether reasonableness is to be assessed at the 
level of the entire program or of the individual stop. If the former, these 
roadblocks probably are legal, given the high “hit” rate and the only 
modestly intrusive character of the stops.29 
 
In this sense, the distinction between program-level and individual-level analyses 
is outcome determinative. The program-level assessment triggers a cost-benefit analysis 
which, in practically all cases, favors law enforcement. The major cost in the case of the 
Indianapolis roadblocks is the waste of time and invasion of privacy suffered by each 
person stopped and questioned; other costs include the opportunity cost of using those 
police officers on more pressing police business—such as solving or preventing serious 
crimes like murder or robbery—the equipment costs associated with setting up a 
barricade, and the costs of publicizing and justifying the intervention (maybe the police 
department had to issue a press release and conduct a press hearing, etc.). The benefits of 
the program include the detection of drug contraband, the detection of derelict drivers 
who either have no registration or no licenses, and the deterrent effect on illicit drug 
consumption associated with the publicity surrounding the program—what Judge Posner 
refers to, earlier, as “the deterrence of drug offenses produced by these hits.”30 A 
program-level cost-benefit analysis would compare the aggregated costs and benefits. As 
Judge Posner suggests, at the program-level the equation would likely favor the 
roadblocks because of the supposedly large deterrent effects.  
But an individual-level assessment would likely go the other way, especially in 
cases involving randomized searches where there is no witness identification or police 
intelligence. The individual-level assessment requires a showing of some “individualized 
suspicion of wrongdoing,” and that will only exist in certain cases, such as those where 
there are identifications or observations by the police. The requirement of individualized 
suspicion does not trigger a cost-benefit analysis and therefore does not allow for 
pragmatic considerations involving the needs of law enforcement.  
Judge Posner acknowledges that the program-level analysis is a pro-government 
standard. Posner writes: 
                                                 
29  Edmond, 183 F3d at 661 (majority). 
30 Id at 662. 
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Because it is infeasible to quantify the benefits and costs of most law 
enforcement programs, the program approach might well permit deep 
inroads into privacy. In high-crime areas of America’s cities it might 
justify methods of policing that are associated with totalitarian nations. 
One can imagine an argument that it would be reasonable in a drug-
infested neighborhood to administer drug tests randomly to drivers and 
pedestrians.31 
 
Knowing this, Judge Posner nevertheless declares that, in conventional criminal 
law enforcement settings, an individual-level assessment is ordinarily appropriate: 
“courts do not usually assess reasonableness at the program-level when they are dealing 
with searches related to general criminal law enforcement.”32 Or at least, “ordinarily” 
so.33 Judge Posner, reviewing prior cases, finds four exceptions to the ordinary situation. 
Those exceptions include, first, the case where police officers have information that a 
dangerous criminal is escaping along a certain route. Here, there is heightened risk that 
allows for preemption in favor of program-level review.34 Second, and this is perhaps the 
most important in relation to Posner’s book Not a Suicide Pact, there is an exception 
when law enforcement faces a terrorist threat. Posner offers the following example: “if 
the Indianapolis police had a credible tip that a car loaded with dynamite and driven by 
an unidentified terrorist was en route to downtown Indianapolis.”35 In this case of 
national emergency, the court should switch to the program-level review. Judge Posner 
identifies a third exception for regulatory measures, such as sobriety checkpoints or other 
randomized search programs involving drug testing for law enforcement officers or 
railroad engineers; and a fourth exception for immigration checkpoints searching for 
illegal immigrants or contraband crossing the borders.36 
In all these exceptional cases, Judge Posner declares, courts reviewing police 
practices should and do properly adopt a program-level cost-benefit analysis—which, not 
surprisingly, results in their being found constitutional. Thus, by sorting police practices 
along the lines of traditional criminal law enforcement versus emergency and regulatory 
                                                 
31  Id 
32  Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id at 662–63, citing United States v Harper, 617 F2d 35, 40–41 (4th Cir 1980). 
35  Id at 663. 
36 Id. 
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enforcement, Judge Posner is in effect using the choice of the level of review to allow 
some roadblocks, but not others. The alternative, Posner suggests with a slip of the pen, is 
to either ban all or allow all roadblocks: “The alternative would be to rule that either all 
roadblocks are illegal or none are, which would be akin to punishing all killings 
identically because the ‘objective’ fact is that someone has died.”37 I say “slip of the pen” 
because those are not really the two “alternatives,” naturally. The real alternatives are 
either an individual- or a program-level review. It’s only if that choice is entirely 
outcome determinative that the existing alternatives become an all-or-nothing 
proposition. 
In contrast to Judge Posner, Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing in dissent, adopts 
precisely the kind of program-level analysis that inescapably favors law enforcement. 
What is required, Judge Easterbrook writes, is an analysis of the costs and benefits of the 
program. There is no distinction between traditional criminal law enforcement or 
regulatory programs, and no special exception carved for terrorism or other extraordinary 
circumstances: the program-level analysis applies, and it applies across the board to all 
roadblock cases.38 
 
II. PERSONALITY, VALUES, AND SENSIBILITIES 
 
The first point to make, then, is that Judge Posner displays a slight libertarian 
tendency. In ordinary criminal cases, where the purpose of the police intervention is the 
traditional enforcement of the criminal law, police practices are to be evaluated using an 
individual-level assessment and require a finding of individualized suspicion. In contrast 
to a program-level review, the individual-level assessment rests on a libertarian 
framework, in the sense that the default position favors individual liberty. That default 
can only be overcome under very strict and precise conditions involving the existence of 
“individualized suspicion.” No cost-benefit weighing, nor any pragmatic considerations 
can overcome the liberty presumption. This in itself is libertarian-leaning. 
But even more importantly, Posner embraces in Edmond the libertarian-style 
fiction that “individualized suspicion” operates in a binary, on-off manner, rather than 
                                                 
37  Id at 665. 
38  Id at 668 (Easterbrook dissenting). 
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along a continuum of degrees. The truth is that suspicion is a probabilistic notion. 
Suspicion is measured along a probability scale. We know, for instance, that the average 
level of suspicion for individuals traveling on the roads that were blocked by the 
Indianapolis police was 4.74 percent for drug contraband.39 We know this after the fact, 
but we know it nonetheless. It would be entirely fair to say that for each and every one of 
those automobile travelers, we had “individualized suspicion” of 4.74 percent. Richard 
Posner writes that “here the roadblock is meant to intercept a completely random sample 
of drivers; there is neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop any given 
driver.”40 But that, of course, is a legal formalist statement that is substantially inaccurate: 
for each driver, there was a 4.74 percent chance that they were carrying drugs. That is a 
very specific and articulable level of suspicion.  
This notion of an “articulable level of suspicion” is no different than in the classic 
case of witness identification. So, for instance, if a victim testifies that the perpetrator 
was a University of Chicago graduate student who spoke French, and there are, say, 450 
graduate students at the University of Chicago who are French speakers out of a student 
body of 9,000, then we can easily conclude that our “individualized suspicion” to 
question fluent French-speaking grad students reaches 5 percent. We can quantify and 
establish before questioning our exact level of “individualized suspicion” and determine 
whether it meets some minimum threshold to justify detaining and questioning any 
graduate students. 
The only difference between these two cases is a temporal one: we do not know 
the level of individualized suspicion in the roadblock case until after we have begun to 
conduct some stops and visual and canine searches at the roadblocks. (And even here, 
since this involves a random sample of motorists, we can be pretty confident that we will 
have similar levels of suspicion at similarly selected sites in the near future; we could 
also obtain this information through research or surveys). In the second case, we know 
from the witness identification the level of suspicion and can use that to justify our stops 
and questioning. In both cases, we can easily determine the level of suspicion. In each 
case, we can find the actual level of “individualized suspicion.” 
                                                 
39  Id at 661 (majority) (reporting 55 drug-related arrests out of 1,161 vehicles stopped, or 0.0474).” 
40  Id at 663. 
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In other words, there was “individualized suspicion” in the Edmond case and 
Judge Posner could have found that the individual-level standard was satisfied. What he 
meant to say, of course, is that there was not enough individualized suspicion, but here 
too he could easily have found that there was. The courts have never established a 
percentage requirement for individualized suspicion or probable cause, and as Judge 
Easterbrook notes in dissent, individualized suspicion has been found at far less than 4.74 
percent. Judge Posner’s refusal to find it here reflects a libertarian bias.  
As Judge Posner himself must recognize, conclusions about the sufficiency of the 
evidence of individualized suspicion, just like conclusions about the costs and benefits of 
law enforcement initiatives, are purely metaphorical. Posner concedes that “it is 
infeasible to quantify the benefits and costs of most law enforcement programs.”41 Judges 
in these types of cases have no real clue how search success rates compare, what level of 
success should be expected, or what the benefits of these law enforcement programs are. 
They have no good evidence to assess hit rates, nor do they know what the hit rates really 
mean in terms of the quality of the searches, or more importantly whether the searches 
have any deterrent impact. 
 So, for instance, it is worth noting that the 4.74 percent drug hit rate—or, for that 
matter, the 8.96 percent overall hit rate including minor traffic violations42—is not really 
“spectacular,” as Judge Easterbrook suggests.43 Hit rates from other law enforcement 
interventions have been far greater. For example, the Maryland state patrol between 
January 1995 and January 1999 achieved drug hit rates along Maryland’s I-95 corridor of 
32 percent with regard to white drivers and 34 percent with regard to African-American 
drivers.44 In Missouri for the year 2001, police traffic stops achieved drug hit rates—
that’s drugs only, not including faulty drivers’ licenses—of 19.7, 12.3 and 9.8 percent 
respectively for whites, African-Americans, and Hispanics.45 A 1982 Department of 
Justice study of airport searches using a drug-courier profile reported forty-nine 
                                                 
41  Id at 662. 
42 Id at 661 (noting a total of 104 arrests out of 1,161 stops, or a rate of 0.0896). 
43 Id at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting) (suggesting that the hit rate is “spectacularly successful”). 
44  Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and 
Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U Chi L Rev 1275, 1292 (2004). 
45  Id at 1293. 
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successful searches based on ninety-six total searches, for a hit rate of 51.04 percent.46 A 
government report analyzing New York City stop-and-frisks, prepared in 1999, revealed 
average hit rates (stop-to-arrest) of approximately 13.7 percent in situations found to 
present reasonable suspicion.47 In the abstract, devoid of any comparative evidence about 
search success rates in other contexts, the 4.74 percent drug hit rate may well seem 
“high” or even “spectacularly successful”; however, that may be an artifact of judicial 
decision-making with no data, a perennial problem in constitutional criminal procedure. 48 
Second, the judges in the Edmond case have no idea what the quality of the 
successful searches was at those roadblocks. The Maryland data from the 1990s are 
revealing in this regard. Though the hit rates there seem high—seven times higher than in 
the Edmond case—it turns out that 84 percent of the successful searches revealed only 
trace or personal-use amounts of drugs. Even worse, 68 percent of the successful searches 
were for trace or personal-use quantities of marijuana only.49 That’s hardly impressive, 
and for all we know, the same type of “success” is being achieved at the Edmond 
roadblocks. 
Third, there is no good evidence that detecting trace or personal use quantities of 
drugs on drivers—especially marijuana—is going to have any effect on drug markets and 
drug dealing. Posner’s finding mentioned above—that “the deterrence of drug offenses 
produced by these hits advances the strong national, state, and local policy of 
discouraging the illegal use of controlled substances”50—is entirely speculative, perhaps 
even fantastic. There is really no good reason to believe that catching trace amounts of 
marijuana in automobile ashtrays in Indianapolis is going to discourage drug use at the 
national level.   
 Judge Posner acknowledges that the weighing process he and other judges engage 
in is purely subjective, and will vary widely depending on the decision maker, his or her 
temperament, tastes, and sensibilities. In this sense, Posner’s conclusion in Edmond 
                                                 
46  Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing and Punishing in an Actuarial Age 15–16 
(Chicago 2007). 
47  Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science 
Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J Crim L & Criminol 733, 789 (2000). 
48  For an argument proposing increased use of social science evidence in constitutional criminal procedure, 
see generally id. 
49  Harcourt, 71 U Chi L Rev at 1320 (cited in note 44). 
50 Edmond, 183 F3d at 662 (emphasis added). 
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reveals a subjective libertarian orientation. This is clear by contrast to Judge Easterbrook. 
In his dissent, Easterbrook deploys the type of program-level analysis that necessarily 
weighs against the civil rights claim. Easterbrook would have ruled against the 
constitutional claim based on this simple, four-part syllogism: (1) “First, the privacy 
interest of drivers is diminished relative to the interests of people at home or in the 
office;” (2) “Second, the invasion of privacy at a roadblock is slight;” (3) “Third, a small 
invasion can be justified by aggregate success. . . . Martinez-Fuerte holds a probability 
under 1% will do for a roadblock, and in Indianapolis the probability is much greater”; 
and fourth, “the principal risk in allowing stops of vehicles without person-specific cause 
is that the officers will abuse the discretion thus conveyed.”51 The overwhelming 
precedent in this area of the law, Easterbrook argues, is that the civil libertarian loses. 
Judge Posner, however, refuses to move the analysis to the program-level. It would 
require an exception or an emergency, and, Posner finds, “no such urgency has been 
shown here.”52 
 
 Pragmatic and Authoritarian 
In sum, Judge Posner displays a libertarian bias, however slight. At the same time, 
Judge Posner is avowedly pragmatic: his libertarian streak may well hold in the case of 
ordinary criminal law enforcement, but not in times of national emergency. Urgent times 
call for urgent measures: “When urgent considerations of the public safety require 
compromise with the normal principles constraining law enforcement, the normal 
principles may have to bend,” Judge Posner declares. “The Constitution is not a suicide 
pact.”53 
This represents the pragmatic or practical-minded approach that Judge Posner 
advocates for constitutional analysis writ large. Rather than treat the constitution as 
wooden and inflexible, Posner uses devices, such as the state of exception, to try to 
protect society. Posner regards himself as a “practical-minded judge”—a pragmatist—
                                                 
51  Id at 669–70 (Easterbrook dissenting) (citations omitted). Easterbrook considers one other factor—the 
likelihood for abuse of discretion, but finding that it is not present here, concludes that “the concern that led 
to Prouse is missing, and the first three considerations show that the roadblock is reasonable.” Id at 670. 
52  Id at 663 (majority). 
53  Id. 
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putting forward “a more flexible, practical approach.”54 His book, Not a Suicide Pact, he 
tells us, reflects just this approach. The book is “about the marginal adjustments in 
[constitutional] rights that practical-minded judges make when the values that underlie 
the rights—values such as personal liberty and privacy—come into conflict with values 
of equal importance, such as public safety, suddenly magnified by the onset of a national 
emergency.”55 
In this regard, the individual structure of Posner’s arguments in Not a Suicide Pact 
is similar to the form of analysis in Edmond: times of national emergency create an 
exception to normal constitutional review and, in such times, judges and public citizens 
must assess enforcement measures using a program-level cost-benefit analysis, rather 
than an individual stop assessment. Thus, in Not a Suicide Pact, Richard Posner adopts a 
program-level analysis when he reviews the constitutionality of random searches of 
subway riders’ bags in New York City, dragnet police stops in the case of a terrorist 
threat, warantless eavesdropping outside the FISA framework, and other counter-
terrorism measures.56 
Pragmatic libertarianism may strike many as an oxymoron—especially more 
staunch civil libertarians on both the Left and the Right. This is understandable: to many 
libertarians, civil liberties protections are most needed during times of crisis. During 
ordinary or normal periods of democratic existence, we can rely more easily on 
reasonable public discourse or even educated public opinion. It is when the public 
imagination is enflamed by national crises that we need, more than ever, a civil liberties 
framework. 
But the introduction of pragmatic concerns does not necessarily vitiate the 
libertarian perspective. The key question becomes: What flavor of pragmatism? The fact 
is, the pragmatic impulse can come in two very different tastes: one that still puts law 
enforcement measures to a serious test—in other words, one where the outcome is not 
predetermined from the turn to program-level analysis—and another, more authoritarian 
approach, where the mere placement of the measure within the category of the national 
emergency by necessary implication produces a foreseeable result. If that foreseeable 
                                                 
54  Posner, Not a Suicide Pact at 9 (cited in note 2). 
55  Id at 1. 
56  Id at 90–93. 
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result always favors law enforcement, I would label the approach “pro-government.” 
Posner calls it “authoritarian,” as when he writes that “[t]he weights are influenced by 
personal factors, such as temperament (whether authoritarian or permissive) . . .”57 
Following Posner’s lead, then, I will call this style “authoritarian.” 
This, then, is what makes Richard Posner a pragmatic libertarian authoritarian. It 
should come as little surprise that Judge Posner, in his capacity as author of Not a Suicide 
Pact, essentially finds for the government across an array of law enforcement 
techniques—ranging from unwarranted wiretaps to the use of coercive interrogation 
including torture. As long as the program has some conceivable benefit, given the 
extraordinary costs associated with a terrorist attack, the measures become appropriate. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Richard Posner’s unique brand of libertarianism—pragmatic and authoritarian—
combines, in a curious way, deep distrust of government intervention in economic 
matters, sincere belief in government incompetence, and yet unbounded trust that the 
government will not abuse or mismanage its augmented enforcement responsibilities 
during a time of national security emergency. In contrast to pragmatic libertarians on the 
Left, it is not skeptical of the government’s ability to properly safeguard sensitive or 
personal information, to limit the use of excess force, or to avoid abusing these newfound 
powers. It sides, ultimately and almost unquestioningly, with the government and its law 
enforcement apparatus in difficult times. 
 It is possible, on this view, that civil liberties are only left safeguarded when it 
hardly matters. And that, even there, the protections may be extremely precarious. Judge 
Posner observes, in the final paragraph of the Edmond opinion, that the roadblocks in 
Indianapolis could have been justified under the national emergency exception: 
 
The high hit rate of Indianapolis’s roadblock scheme suggests that 
Indianapolis has placed the roadblocks in areas of the city in which drug 
use approaches epidemic proportions; and if so the roadblocks might be 
justified by reference to the second exception, as illustrated by such cases 
as Maxwell (involving a flurry of drive-by shootings), Norwood (threat of 
                                                 
57  Id at 25.   
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violence at a rally of motorcycle gangs), and Williams (Indian 
insurrection).58 
 
In other words, the situation in Indianapolis (with hit rates about seven times lower than 
in Maryland) was apparently approaching crisis proportions, similar in scale to the 
present terrorist threat, and Judge Posner may well have approved the roadblocks on 
those grounds. 
 But still, Judge Posner did not do that. He could have, but he didn’t. Which leaves 
Richard Posner, on this Rorschach inkblot test, still a bit of a libertarian, always 
pragmatic, and staunchly authoritarian. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor Bernard E. Harcourt 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 harcourt@uchicago.edu 
                                                 
58 Edmond, 183 F3d at 666. 
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